Intel Israel has filed a lawsuit in the Haifa District Court, alleging that a former employee and a supplier embezzled over NIS 3 million (around US$840,000).

The lawsuit names Natalia Avtsin, a former employee in Intel’s hardware production department, and Yafim Tsibolevsky, a former supplier.

According to the lawsuit, Avtsin and Tsibolevsky worked together on a fraudulent scheme between October 2023 and November 2024, when Avtsin was dismissed.

Avtsin is accused of misclassifying purchases from “components” to “services,” which bypassed essential verification steps.

Tsibolevsky, operating as an Intel supplier under “Energy Electronics 2000,” allegedly submitted invoices that were approved without proper scrutiny due to this misclassification.

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🔗 Source: Calcalist

🧠 Food for thought

1️⃣ Procurement classification loopholes reveal critical control weaknesses

The Intel case highlights a common vulnerability in corporate financial controls where simply changing transaction classifications can circumvent security measures.

By reclassifying purchases from “components” to “services,” the perpetrators exploited a specific verification gap, as services didn’t require delivery confirmation while components did.

This manipulation demonstrates how determined insiders can identify and exploit procedural differences between transaction categories, a pattern seen in other corporate fraud cases.

The accused also allegedly kept most fraudulent invoices just under Avtsin’s $20,000 approval threshold, showing the careful calibration typical in procurement fraud schemes.

This pattern of “threshold gaming” is a recognized red flag in corporate finance, where transactions clustered just below approval limits often indicate deliberate manipulation of control systems.

2️⃣ Insider-outsider collusion presents unique detection challenges

The Intel scheme reflects a particularly dangerous fraud pattern where internal knowledge combines with external execution, creating detection blind spots.

Unlike external schemes like the Lithuanian BEC fraud case that stole $120 million from tech companies, insider involvement provides legitimacy to transactions that might otherwise trigger alerts.

The fact that Intel discovered the fraud only after Avtsin’s unrelated termination highlights how insider participation can mask suspicious activities within normal business operations.

Research shows that frauds involving employee-vendor collusion typically continue longer and cause greater losses than those perpetrated by employees acting alone.

This case demonstrates a common procurement fraud vulnerability where employees with legitimate system access can approve payments to conspirators while bypassing standard verification protocols.

Recent Intel developments

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